Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International Mergers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2001
Volume: 10
Issue: 4
Pages: 565-590

Authors (2)

Satya P. Das Sarbajit Sengupta (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The formation of international mergers is examined in the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information, one when a local firm has private information on market size and the other when a foreign firm has private information on its technology. In each situation, parametric configurations are identified under which a merger offer may or may not be made. It also examines the kind of offer and the probability of its acceptance. The likelihood of a merger beingformed is also related to the basic market size, demand uncertainty, and cost uncertainty. Welfare effects of tax/subsidy policies by the host country are also analyzed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:10:y:2001:i:4:p:565-590
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25