Failed Cooperation in Heterogeneous Industries Under the National Recovery Administration

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 1997
Volume: 57
Issue: 2
Pages: 322-344

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A case study, a formal model, and an anaLysis of Census of Manufactures data support a conclusion that cost heterogeneity was a major source of the “compliance crisis” affecting a number of National Recovery Administration “codes of fair competition.” Key elements of the argument are assumptions that progressives at the NRA allowed majority coalitions of small, high-cost finns to impose codes in heterogeneous industries, and that these codes were designed by the high-cost firms under an ultimately erroneous belief that they would be enforced by the NRA.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:57:y:1997:i:02:p:322-344_01
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24