Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2005
Volume: 23
Issue: 2
Pages: 341-372

Authors (2)

Leif Danziger (not in RePEc) Shoshana Neuman (Bar Ilan University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often-protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:v:23:y:2005:i:2:p:341-372
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25