A Pareto-improving Minimum Wage

C-Tier
Journal: Economica
Year: 2015
Volume: 82
Issue: 326
Pages: 236-252

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecca12119-abs-0001"> <p>This paper shows that a graduated minimum wage, in contrast to a constant minimum wage, can provide a strict Pareto improvement over what can be achieved with an optimal income tax. The reason is that a graduated minimum wage requires high-productivity workers to work more to earn the same income as low-productivity workers, which makes it more difficult for the former to mimic the latter. In effect, a graduated minimum wage allows the low-productivity workers to benefit from second-degree price discrimination, which increases their income.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:econom:v:82:y:2015:i:326:p:236-252
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25