Super-additivity and concavity are equivalent for Pareto optimal n-agent bargaining solutions

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 157
Issue: C
Pages: 50-52

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that, for Pareto optimal n-player bargaining solutions, the conditions of super-additivity and concavity are equivalent. Further, either condition implies homogeneity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:50-52
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24