The reinforcement heuristic in normal form games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2018
Volume: 152
Issue: C
Pages: 224-234

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze simple reinforcement-based behavioral rules in 3 × 3 games through choice data and response times. We argue that there is a large overlap between reinforcement-based heuristics (win-stay, lose-shift) and the more “rational” behavioral rule of myopic best reply. However, evidence from response times shows that choices in agreement with the common prescription of those rules are comparatively fast, and choices of the form “lose-shift” occur more frequently for larger differences with bygone payoffs. Both observations speak in favor of reinforcement processes as a cognitive shortcut for apparent myopic best reply, and advise caution when interpreting behavioral results in favor of optimizing behavior.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:152:y:2018:i:c:p:224-234
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24