Hidden symmetries and focal points

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 1
Pages: 226-258

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:226-258
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24