Large extensive form games

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 52
Issue: 1
Pages: 75-102

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:52:y:2013:i:1:p:75-102
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24