Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of choice

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2000
Volume: 15
Issue: 1
Pages: 221-226

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is logically related to conditions of consistency of choice (in particular, to Arrow's choice axiom). The relation, however, is indirect. The link is provided by an independence condition due to Hansson (Synthese, 1969) which applies to fixed agenda social choice rules.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:1:p:221-226
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25