Credit Rationing: Something's Gotta Give

C-Tier
Journal: Economica
Year: 2006
Volume: 73
Issue: 292
Pages: 563-578

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Equilibrium credit rationing, in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss, is shown to imply that the marginal cost of funds to the borrower is infinite. So entrepreneurs have an overwhelming incentive to cut their loans by a dollar and so avoid rationing. Ways of doing this include scaling down the project, decreasing consumption, or delaying the project to accumulate more savings. Credit rationing emerges for indivisible projects only when delay causes sufficient deterioration. Borrowers then apply for funds at the first opportunity, but, counterfactually, once denied a loan, they never reapply. Conditions for credit rationing are stringent indeed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:econom:v:73:y:2006:i:292:p:563-578
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25