NCAA Enforcement and Competitive Balance in College Football

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2006
Volume: 72
Issue: 4
Pages: 826-845

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article investigates the effects of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) enforcement on the competitive balance of major college football conferences in the context of the standard empirical crime model. Using an unbalanced panel describing 11 major Division IA football conferences from 1953 through 2003, NCAA enforcement efforts, in the form of investigations and probations, and the severity of punishment, measured as the average length of probations imposed, are found to have opposite but not necessarily offsetting effects on competitive balance. Greater levels of enforcement in a conference improve competitive balance. On the other hand, greater severity of punishment reduces competitive balance. The empirical evidence indicates that these changes take approximately five years to be fully dissipated. Overall, the empirical results indicate that, on average, the net effect of NCAA enforcement is an improvement in competitive balance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:72:y:2006:i:4:p:826-845
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25