Delegation of Authority In Business Organizations: An Empirical Test

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 52
Issue: 1
Pages: 53-80

Authors (2)

Massimo G. Colombo (not in RePEc) Marco Delmastro (Centro Ricerche Enrico Fermi)

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper tests the predictions of economic theory on the determinants of the allocation of decision‐making power through the estimates of ordered probit models with random effects. Our findings show that the complexity of plants' operations and organization, the characteristics of the communication technologies in use, the ownership status of plants and the product mix of their parent companies figure prominently in explaining whether authority is delegated to the plant manager or not. In addition, the nature of the decision under consideration turns out to affect the allocation of authority.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:52:y:2004:i:1:p:53-80
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25