Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2013
Volume: 157
Issue: 3
Pages: 387-410

Authors (2)

Jakob Haan (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) Jeroen Klomp (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Until recently, most research on political budget cycles was based on the (often implicit) presumption that these cycles do not differ across countries. However, more recent studies focus on heterogeneity. This paper surveys studies examining the factors conditioning the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes, at the aggregate level or at the level of a particular type of government expenditure. Conditioning factors discussed include: the level of development, institutional quality, age and level of democracy, electoral rules and form of government, transparency of the political process, the presence of checks and balances, and fiscal rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:3:p:387-410
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25