The number of active bidders in internet auctions

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 4
Pages: 1726-1736

Authors (3)

de Haan, Laurens (not in RePEc) de Vries, Casper G. (not in RePEc) Zhou, Chen (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. Under the Independent Private Values Paradigm the valuations of the active bidders form a specific record sequence. This record sequence implies that if the number n of potential bidders is large, the number of active bidders is approximately 2logn, potentially explaining the relative inactivity. Moreover, if the arrival of potential bidders forms a non-homogeneous Poisson process due to a time preference for auctions that are soon to close, then the arrival process of the active bidders is approximately a Poisson arrival process.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:4:p:1726-1736
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25