Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2000
Volume: 55
Issue: 3
Pages: 1133-1161

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank‐firm data. According to the theory, relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects owing to internal problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from nonrelationship banks. The latter, however, face an adverse selection problem, as they do not know the quality of the project, and may refuse to lend. In these circumstances, multiple banking can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of the project. The empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:55:y:2000:i:3:p:1133-1161
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25