Efficient partnership dissolution under buy‐sell clauses

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 39
Issue: 1
Pages: 184-198

Authors (2)

María‐Angeles de Frutos (not in RePEc) Thomas Kittsteiner (Rheinisch-Westfälische Technis...)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Buy‐sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one party offers a price for the partnership and the other party chooses whether to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. We point out that the selection of the proposing partner is essential for the performance of the clause. Moreover, if partners negotiate for the advantage of being the chooser, then buy‐sell clauses result in an ex post efficient outcome. Such endogenous selection is consistent with how buy‐sell clauses are drafted in practice.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:184-198
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25