Non-Bayesian Persuasion

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2022
Volume: 130
Issue: 10
Pages: 2594 - 2642

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.036 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Following Kamenica and Gentzkow, this paper studies persuasion as an information design problem. We investigate how mistakes in probabilistic inference impact optimal persuasion. The concavification method is shown to extend naturally to a large class of belief updating rules, which we identify and characterize. This class comprises many non-Bayesian models discussed in the literature. We apply this new technique to gain insight into the revelation principle, the ranking of updating rules, when persuasion is beneficial to the sender, and when it is detrimental to the receiver. Our key result also extends to shed light on the question of robust persuasion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/720464
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25