Mortgage companies and regulatory arbitrage

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2016
Volume: 122
Issue: 2
Pages: 328-351

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Mortgage companies (MCs) do not fall under the strict regulatory regime of depository institutions. We empirically show that this gap resulted in regulatory arbitrage and allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to circumvent consumer compliance regulations, mitigate capital requirements, and reduce exposure to loan-related losses. Compared to bank subsidiaries, MC subsidiaries of BHCs originated riskier mortgages to borrowers with lower credit scores, lower incomes, higher loan-to-income ratios, and higher default rates. Our results imply that precrisis regulations had the capacity to mitigate the deterioration of lending standards if consistently applied and enforced for all types of intermediaries.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:122:y:2016:i:2:p:328-351
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25