Capital Controls, Global Liquidity Traps, and the International Policy Trilemma

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 116
Issue: 1
Pages: 158-189

Authors (2)

Michael B. Devereux (not in RePEc) James Yetman (Bank for International Settlem...)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The zero bound on interest rates introduces a new dimension to the trilemma in international policy. The openness of the international financial market might render monetary policy ineffective, even within a system of fully flexible exchange rates, because shocks that lead to a liquidity trap in one country are propagated through financial markets to other countries. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be restored by the imposition of capital controls. We derive the optimal response of monetary policy to a global liquidity trap in the presence of capital controls. We show that, even though capital controls might facilitate effective monetary policy, capital controls are not generally desirable in terms of welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:116:y:2014:i:1:p:158-189
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25