European banking: Bailout, bail-in and state aid control

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2014
Volume: 34
Issue: C
Pages: 37-43

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

More than 5years after the fall of Lehman Brothers, and at a time where the Banking Union will start with a Balance Sheet Assessment, several regulatory initiatives are trying to make bailouts harder, and push forward ‘bail-in’ as an alternative. This article discusses the pros and cons of these initiatives, and stresses in particular, looking at various cases of banking crises, that financial instability can be much more costly than bailouts. It therefore pleads for: (i) not ruling out prefunded bailouts as an alternative/complement to bail-in, especially to deal with negative macroeconomic shocks; (ii) making sure markets will understand that the risk of bail-in is concentrated on long-term bank liabilities.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:37-43
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25