Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2015
Volume: 7
Issue: 4
Pages: 233-51

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the two-player electronic mail game (EMG), as is well-known, the probability of collective action is lower the more confirmations and reconfirmations are made available to players. In the multiplayer EMG, however, we show players may coordinate on equilibria where they require only few of the available confirmations from each other to act. In this case, increasing the number of available confirmations may either create equilibria with positive probability of collective action when none existed before, or may increase the probability of collective action, if equilibria with positive probability of collective action already existed for fewer available confirmations. (JEL C70, D71, D82, D83)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:4:p:233-51
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25