The Extension of Credit with Nonexclusive Contracts and Sequential Banking Externalities

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 1
Pages: 233-71

Authors (3)

Giacomo De Giorgi (not in RePEc) Andres Drenik (not in RePEc) Enrique Seira (University of Notre Dame)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Nonexclusive sequential borrowing can increase default and impose externalities on prior lenders. We document that sequential banking is pervasive with substantial effects. Using credit card applications from a large bank and data on the applicants' entire loan portfolios, we find that an additional credit line causes a 5.9 percentage point decline in default for high-score borrowers on previous loans. However, for low-score borrowers, it causes a 19 percentage point increase. The former use the new credit to smooth payments on preexisting loans, while the latter increase their total debt. These results have implications for "no-universal-default" regulation and financial inclusion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:1:p:233-71
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25