Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
We use the two-country euro area model developed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) to study policymaking in a monetary union. We focus on: 1) a two-policymaker setting where there is strategic interaction between a single monetary authority and an EMU-level macro-prudential authority, and; 2) a three-policymaker setting where there is strategic interaction between a single monetary authority and two regional-level macroprudential authorities. In the former, price stability and financial stability are pursued at the area-wide level, while in the latter each macro-prudential authority adopts region-specific objectives. We compare cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in simultaneous-move and leadership environments, each obtained assuming discretionary policymaking. In the two-policymaker setting, we find that the gains from either the monetary authority or the macroprudential regulator having a first-mover, or leadership, advantage are somewhat limited, and the most favorable outcome is achieved under cooperation where both policies are formulated and conducted simultaneously. In the three-policymaker setting, we find that delegating macroprudential policy to regional macroprudential regulators plays an important role in achieving regional stability.