A mechanism for eliciting the mean and quantiles of a random variable

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 121
Issue: 1
Pages: 121-123

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We present two Becker–DeGroot–Marschak type incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms. The first can be used to elicit an agent’s belief about the mean of a random variable while the second elicits the quantiles.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:1:p:121-123
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25