A rational, economic model of paygo tax rates

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 89
Issue: C
Pages: 55-72

Authors (4)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We argue that paygo rates are determined by a representative agent and a benevolent government jointly maximizing the expected life-time utility of the agent. The distributions of labor and capital income are calculated from national data on real GDP, real wages and the real return to capital since 1950. With uniform risk aversion, predicted rates explain 83% of the variance of observed rates. The globalization of capital markets would lead to convergence of paygo rates. Our results are immune to crises like 2008.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:89:y:2016:i:c:p:55-72
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25