Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 71
Issue: 2
Pages: 570-592

Authors (4)

Francesco Decarolis (Università Commerciale Luigi B...) Maris Goldmanis (not in RePEc) Antonio Penta (not in RePEc) Ksenia Shakhgildyan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:71:y:2023:i:2:p:570-592
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25