Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2021
Volume: 53
Issue: 7
Pages: 1677-1717

Authors (3)

Ralph De Haas (KU Leuven) Matteo Millone (not in RePEc) Jaap Bos (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.673 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze contract‐level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a competitive microcredit market. Our findings are threefold. First, information sharing reduces defaults, especially among new borrowers, and increases the return on lending. Second, lending tightens at the extensive margin as loan officers, using the new registry, reject more applications. Third, lending also tightens at the intensive margin: microloans become smaller, shorter, and more expensive. This affects both new borrowers and lending relationships established before the registry. In contrast, repeat borrowers whose lending relationship started after the registry introduction begin to benefit from larger loans at lower interest rates.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:53:y:2021:i:7:p:1677-1717
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25