Risk and the Corporate Structure of Banks

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2010
Volume: 65
Issue: 3
Pages: 1075-1096

Authors (2)

GIOVANNI DELL'ARICCIA (not in RePEc) ROBERT MARQUEZ (University of California-Davis)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary‐based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate‐level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch‐based structures are preferred to subsidiary‐based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic risk, and vice versa. Greater cross‐country risk correlation and more accurate pricing of risk by investors reduce the differences between the two structures. Furthermore, a bank's corporate structure affects its risk taking and affiliate size.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:65:y:2010:i:3:p:1075-1096
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25