Further results on the Bertrand game with different marginal costs

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 116
Issue: 3
Pages: 502-503

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note provides an alternative construction to Blume (2003) of equilibria in the standard model of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products and different marginal costs that achieve the conventional outcome. In addition, I provide a means to select one of these equilibria.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:502-503
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25