Do voters vote ideologically?

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2009
Volume: 144
Issue: 5
Pages: 1868-1894

Authors (2)

Degan, Arianna (not in RePEc) Merlo, Antonio (New York University (NYU))

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote "ideologically" (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically "closest" to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1868-1894
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25