Public goods games and psychological utility: Theory and evidence

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2019
Volume: 167
Issue: C
Pages: 361-390

Authors (3)

Dhami, Sanjit (Leicester University) Wei, Mengxing (not in RePEc) al-Nowaihi, Ali (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.673 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method’ and a within-subjects design, using the strategy method. We find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions. Guilt-aversion is pervasive at the individual-level and the aggregate-level and it is relatively more important than surprise-seeking. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:167:y:2019:i:c:p:361-390
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25