Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2015
Volume: 55
Issue: C
Pages: 81-90

Authors (3)

Dittrich, Dennis A.V. (StepStone) Büchner, Susanne (not in RePEc) Kulesz, Micaela M. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.673 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:55:y:2015:i:c:p:81-90
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25