The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2010
Volume: 145
Issue: 2
Pages: 562-582

Authors (2)

Dietrich, Franz (not in RePEc) Mongin, Philippe

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. Our analysis is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and is arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:2:p:562-582
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25