Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1985
Volume: 52
Issue: 4
Pages: 719-723

Authors (2)

Georges Dionne (not in RePEc) Pierre Lasserre

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this note, we present a strategy which relies on multi-period contracts and on a self-selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period, thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:4:p:719-723.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25