Capital Controls, Risk, and Liberalization Cycles

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 12
Issue: 3
Pages: 412-434

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper presents an overlapping‐generations model where agents vote on whether to open or close the economy to international capital flows. Political decisions are shaped by the risk over capital and labor returns. In an open economy, the capitalists (old) completely hedge their savings income. In contrast, in a closed economy, the workers (young) partially insulate wages from the productivity shocks. There are three possible equilibrium outcomes: economies that eventually remain open; those that eventually remain closed; and those that cycle between open and closed. In line with the stylized facts, cycles are more common in economies with intermediate development levels.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:12:y:2004:i:3:p:412-434
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24