Bargaining in small dynamic markets

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2023
Volume: 207
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

4.036 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies trade in endogenously evolving markets exhibiting few traders at any given point in time. Traders arrive in the market and bargain until they complete a trade. We find that, unlike large markets, small markets feature trade delay and price dispersion, even when sellers and buyers are homogeneous and matching frictions are small. We characterize transaction prices as a function of the endogenous evolution of the market composition and economic conditions, providing several novel comparative statics results. Our analysis highlights the need to incorporate sub-market structures into the theoretical study of job, real estate, and rental markets, where trade opportunities are typically constrained by both the geographical location and individual characteristics of each trader.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:207:y:2023:i:c:s002205312200179x
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25