Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 127
Issue: 1
Pages: 113-135

Authors (4)

Dimmock, Stephen G. (not in RePEc) Gerken, William C. (University of Kentucky) Ivković, Zoran (not in RePEc) Weisbenner, Scott J.

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:1:p:113-135
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25