A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 122
Issue: C
Pages: 407-412

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a simple proof of strong duality for the linear persuasion problem. The duality is established in Dworczak and Martini (2019), under slightly stronger assumptions, using techniques from the literature on optimization with stochastic dominance constraints and several approximation arguments. We provide a short, alternative proof that is based on a direct argument to show the existence of optimal price functions, and on switching the roles of the primal and the dual to show that there is no duality gap.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:122:y:2020:i:c:p:407-412
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25