A note on information revelation in procurement auctions

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 108
Issue: 3
Pages: 307-310

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), in which suppliers offer differentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some technical remarks and complements to the analysis of Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), and an extension to the case of risk averse suppliers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:307-310
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25