One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 9
Issue: 4
Pages: 1-29

Authors (3)

Quoc-Anh Do (Centre for Economic Policy Res...) Kieu-Trang Nguyen (not in RePEc) Anh N. Tran (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.345 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:1-29
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25