Whether or not to open Pandora's box

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2018
Volume: 175
Issue: C
Pages: 127-158

Score contribution per author:

4.036 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I study a single-agent sequential search problem as in Weitzman (1979). Contrary to Weitzman, conditional on stopping, the agent may take any uninspected box without first inspecting its contents. This introduces a new trade-off. By taking a box without inspection, the agent saves on its inspection costs. However, by inspecting it, he may discover that its contents are lower than he anticipated. I identify sufficient conditions on the parameters of the environment under which I characterize the optimal policy. Both the order in which boxes are inspected and the stopping rule may differ from that in Weitzman's model. Moreover, I provide additional results that partially characterize the optimal policy when these conditions fail.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:127-158
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25