A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2018
Volume: 175
Issue: C
Pages: 178-200

Authors (3)

Doğan, Battal (University of Bristol) Doğan, Serhat (not in RePEc) Yıldız, Kemal (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.345 = (α=2.02 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce and analyze an efficiency criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This efficiency criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide conditions under which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:178-200
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25