Bargaining over Babies: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2019
Volume: 109
Issue: 9
Pages: 3264-3306

Authors (2)

Matthias Doepke (not in RePEc) Fabian Kindermann (Universität Regensburg)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

It takes a woman and a man to make a baby. This fact suggests that for a birth to take place, the parents should first agree on wanting a child. Using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes, we show that indeed, babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one. In addition, there are many couples who disagree on having babies, and in low-fertility countries women are much more likely than men to be opposed to having another child. We account for this evidence with a quantitative model of household bargaining in which the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers is a key determinant of fertility. The model implies that fertility is highly responsive to targeted policies that lower the child care burden specifically for mothers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:9:p:3264-3306
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25