Labor Market Quotas When Promotions Are Signals

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2021
Volume: 39
Issue: 2
Pages: 437 - 460

Authors (4)

Suzanne H. Bijkerk (not in RePEc) Silvia Dominguez-Martinez (not in RePEc) Jurjen Kamphorst (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam) Otto H. Swank (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better off without quotas. Next we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn women’s abilities to make better job assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/710358
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25