Proportional concessions and the leximin solution

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 114
Issue: 3
Pages: 288-291

Score contribution per author:

1.009 = (α=2.02 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this note we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefits when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopia values. We reconsider the leximin solution (Imai, 1983), and obtain an alternative characterization on the basis of PCM.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:288-291
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25