Is More Information Better? The Effects of "Report Cards" on Health Care Providers

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2003
Volume: 111
Issue: 3
Pages: 555-588

Authors (4)

David Dranove (Northwestern University) Daniel Kessler (not in RePEc) Mark McClellan (not in RePEc) Mark Satterthwaite (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.018 = (α=2.02 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Health care report cards' public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician or hospital or bothmay address important informational asymmetries in markets for health care, but they may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more difficult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients and for society depends on whether their financial and health benefits outweigh their costs in terms of the quantity, quality, and appropriateness of medical treatment that they induce. Using national data on Medicare patients at risk for cardiac surgery, we find that cardiac surgery report cards in New York and Pennsylvania led both to selection behavior by providers and to improved matching of patients with hospitals. On net, this led to higher levels of resource use and to worse health outcomes, particularly for sicker patients. We conclude that, at least in the short run, these report cards decreased patient and social welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:111:y:2003:i:3:p:555-588
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25