The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Development Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 140
Issue: C
Pages: 242-254

Authors (3)

Dreher, Axel (not in RePEc) Lang, Valentin F. (Universität Mannheim) Richert, Katharina (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Much of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) lending benefits private companies from rich countries and supports projects in middle-income countries. Large corporations such as Lidl or Mövenpick have received its loans for highly profitable investments. This contrasts to some extent with the IFC's official mandate, which is to finance poverty-reducing projects for which private capital is not available on reasonable terms. Investigating a potential driver of this mismatch, we argue that some governments can influence the allocation of IFC loans to the benefit of private companies in their countries. Using new data for more than 3000 IFC projects over the 1995–2015 period we show that (joint) IFC Board membership of countries where borrowing companies are based and of countries where the projects are implemented increases the likelihood that these countries receive IFC loans. This has implications for the debate on leveraging private-sector investments for development.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:deveco:v:140:y:2019:i:c:p:242-254
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25