Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2011
Volume: 101
Issue: 5
Pages: 1739-74

Authors (3)

Esther Duflo (not in RePEc) Pascaline Dupas (not in RePEc) Michael Kremer (University of Chicago)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:5:p:1739-74
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25