Incentives for subjects in internet experiments

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 105
Issue: 1
Pages: 120-122

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky. One simple method is a high score (as in computer games). We test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:120-122
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25