Network Externalities and Standardization: A Classroom Demonstration

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2003
Volume: 69
Issue: 4
Pages: 1000-1008

Authors (6)

Christopher Ruebeck (Lafayette College) Sarah Stafford (not in RePEc) Nicola Tynan (not in RePEc) William Alpert (University of Connecticut) Gwendolyn Ball (not in RePEc) Bridget Butkevich (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.168 = (α=2.01 / 6 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents a classroom game that can be used to demonstrate network externalities, standardization, and switching costs. In the basic game, students independently choose a technology whose value depends on the total number of students choosing that technology. In the next round, sequential decision making is allowed that quickly leads to standardization. Introducing imperfect information and switching costs into subsequent rounds can lead to the real‐world phenomenon of an inferior technology becoming the standard. This exercise can be used in principles of economics classes to teach these important concepts without requiring mathematical models. In more advanced classes, construction of the mathematical model behind the game may be assigned.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:69:y:2003:i:4:p:1000-1008
Journal Field
General
Author Count
6
Added to Database
2026-01-24